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Neuroscience has identified brain structures and functions that correlate with
psychopathic tendencies. Since psychopathic traits can be traced back to physical
neural attributes, it has been argued that psychopaths are not truly responsible for
their actions and therefore should not be blamed for their psychopathic behaviors.
This experimental research aims to evaluate what effect communicating this theory
of psychopathy has on the moral behavior of lay people. If psychopathy is blamed
on the brain, people may feel less morally responsible for their own psychopathic
tendencies and therefore may be more likely to display those tendencies. An online
study will provide participants with false feedback about their psychopathic traits
supposedly based on their digital footprint (i.e., Facebook likes), thus classifying them
as having either above-average or below-average psychopathic traits and describing
psychopathy in cognitive or neurobiological terms. This particular study will assess the
extent to which lay people are influenced by feedback regarding their psychopathic
traits, and how this might affect their moral behavior in online tasks. Public recognition
of these potential negative consequences of neuroscience communication will also be
assessed. A field study using the lost letter technique will be conducted to examine
lay people’s endorsement of neurobiological, as compared to cognitive, explanations
of criminal behavior. This field and online experimental research could inform the future
communication of neuroscience to the public in a way that is sensitive to the potential
negative consequences of communicating such science. In particular, this research may
have implications for the future means by which neurobiological predictors of offending
can be safely communicated to offenders.
Keywords: psychopathy, belief in free will, utilitarian moral judgment, neuroscience communication, dishonesty,
attributions, belief in determinism, self-control
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INTRODUCTION
Since the time of Aristotle it has been argued that all human
behavior can be described in terms of deterministic causality, and
that there is no such thing as free will. Although philosophical
arguments challenging free will have existed for centuries, these
arguments do not appear to have filtered into the lay mind.
However, there has been much recent lay interest in the rise
of neuroscience as a means of explaining complex behaviors
(Legrenzi and UmiltaÌ, 2011). Therefore, one might predict that
in the future, lay belief in free will could be challenged through the
communication of neuroscience. Hence empirical research has
begun to test whether people believe that free will could exist in a
world where all events were products of brain activity (Nahmias
et al., 2007).
This study is concerned with the behavioral implications of
such beliefs. One of the greatest consumers of the neuroscience
behind behavior could be people who might benefit from a
neurobiological understanding of their mental condition. People
may be especially receptive to neuroscience if the explanation
is construed as a scientific means of excusing the socially
disapproved symptoms of their condition. One such condition
is psychopathy. Psychopaths have been shown to differ from
ordinary people in both neurobiological and cognitive terms.
For example, previous research has shown that psychopaths
differ from lay people in moral dilemmas, such that they
choose utilitarian reasoning more often. One focus of our study
is therefore whether a neuroscientific explanation of typical
psychopathic behavior will affect behavior in this sort of task,
perhaps by excusing the behavior as not a result of free will.
In our field study, we will test whether lay people are more
likely to return a postcard that contains a cognitive rather than
a neurobiological explanation of criminal behavior, and whether
they are more likely to return the postcard when it is directed
to prisoners or non-prisoners. Subsequently, we will conduct an
online study in which participants will be given false feedback
about having above-average or below-average psychopathic traits;
we are investigating the effects of communicating either a
neurobiological or cognitive explanation of psychopathy on
reasoning in moral dilemmas and behavior in a measure of actual
cheating (Shalvi et al., 2012).
Behavioral Attributes of Psychopaths –
the Lack of Empathy and Utilitarian
Reasoning
Most established definitions of psychopathy emphasize two
main characteristics of psychopaths: emotional impairment (e.g.,
reduced empathy and guilt) and behavioral disturbance (e.g.,
criminal activity) (Hare, 1991). Of particular importance to
the current study, psychopathy is considered to be one of the
prototypical disorders associated with empathic dysfunction, an
absence of the appropriate empathic response to the suffering of
another (Aniskiewicz, 1979; Hare, 1991).
The psychopath’s lack of affective empathy plays an important
role in moral reasoning. Many studies support a dual-process
model of moral judgment (Greene et al., 2008), in which
both automatic emotional processes and controlled cognitive
processes drive moral judgment. According to this theory,
some moral judgments are driven primarily by social-emotional
responses, while other moral judgments are driven less by social-
emotional responses and more by cognitive processes (Greene
et al., 2004).
Automatic emotional processes normally dominate for
deontological decisions, while controlled cognitive processes
drive utilitarian decisions (Duke and Bègue, 2015). This
distinction is evident in moral dilemmas; a prototypical
utilitarian favors performing actions in the name of the greater
good, while a prototypical deontologist regards this actions as an
unacceptable violation of rights and duties (Greene et al., 2008).
One such moral dilemma is the footbridge dilemma, in
which a trolley threatens to kill five people, who can only be
saved if you decide to push a stranger off the bridge, onto the
tracks below. The stranger will die if you push him, but in the
process, his body will prevent the trolley killing the five others
(Thomson, 1985). Automatic emotional responses tend to drive
people to disapprove of pushing the man off the footbridge,
while controlled cognitive processes tend to drive people to
approve of this action (Greene et al., 2008). Normally, in this
particular dilemma, the automatic emotional response prevails;
most people do not decide to push the man off the bridge
(Greene et al., 2001). However, in the case of psychopathy, one
would expect psychopaths to push the man given their lack
of empathic concern. Studies indeed show that psychopathic
personality characteristics, especially decreased levels of empathy,
correlate with utilitarian choices (e.g., Bartels and Pizarro, 2011;
Conway and Gawronski, 2013; Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013).
Although it’s relatively clear that there’s a strong relationship
between empathic concern and utilitarian reasoning, studies that
actually measure the utilitarian reasoning of psychopaths are very
scarce. In a recent study by Koenigs et al. (2012), psychopathic
and non-psychopathic participants made judgments on 24 moral
dilemmas. Results indicated that across all moral scenarios,
psychopaths endorsed a significantly greater proportion of the
proposed utilitarian actions than did the non-psychopaths.
However, another recent study found no differences in utilitarian
moral judgment between psychopaths and non-psychopaths
(Cima et al., 2010). This lack of significant differences could be
attributed to the smaller sample size and more lenient criteria for
classifying participants as psychopaths (Koenigs et al., 2012).
These studies present participants with a variety of moral
dilemmas, which can be distinguished by the extent to which the
dilemma engages cognitive and affective processes respectively
(Greene et al., 2001). The footbridge dilemma is considered a
“personal dilemma”; it involves direct, intimate, physical contact
(Greene et al., 2004). This type of dilemma engages emotional
processing to a greater extent than other dilemmas (Greene et al.,
2001). Previous studies show that some personal dilemmas, such
as the footbridge dilemma, can be considered relatively easy
(Wiegmann et al., 2013), while others can be considered more
difficult; the latter bring cognitive and emotional factors into a
very balanced tension. An example of a difficult personal dilemma
is the crying baby dilemma, in which participants must decide
whether it is appropriate to smother a child in order to save
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oneself and other townspeople. In response to this dilemma,
participants tend to answer more slowly and show less consensus.
In contrast to personal moral dilemmas, there are also
impersonal dilemmas that involve more indirect, remote actions
or rule violations (Greene et al., 2004) and engage emotional
processing to a lesser extent (Greene et al., 2001). A classic
example of an impersonal moral dilemma is the standard trolley
dilemma (Foot, 1978), in which a runaway trolley is approaching
five railway workmen and the only way to avoid their deaths is to
hit a switch that will cause the trolley to change the path and kill
one single workman instead.
Many previous studies have shown that personal moral
dilemmas, like the footbridge dilemma, elicit increased activity
in brain regions associated with emotion and social cognition
(Greene et al., 2001). Mendez et al. (2005) found that patients
with frontotemporal dementia, who are also known for their
emotional blunting, were disproportionately likely to approve
of the action in the footbridge dilemma. Koenigs et al. (2007)
found similar results studying patients with emotional deficits
due to ventromedial prefrontal lesions. A recent study by
Koenigs et al. (2012) showed that only low-anxious psychopaths
were significantly more likely to endorse personal harms in
moral dilemmas. Compared to non-psychopaths, both types
of psychopaths were significantly more likely to endorse the
impersonal actions. The differences between low and high
anxious psychopaths are less relevant to our study, but the
findings of Koenigs et al. (2012) show that, in order to be
thorough, this study should measure reasoning in both personal
and impersonal dilemmas.
Hence, in our study, we will ask participants to complete
three types of moral dilemmas: an easy personal (the footbridge
dilemma), a difficult personal (the crying baby dilemma) and
an impersonal (the standard trolley dilemma) dilemma; these
tasks will form part of our dependent variables. At the start of
the study, participants will be presented with one explanation
regarding why psychopaths exhibit the low levels of empathy
required to make utilitarian choices in these tasks. Importantly,
only one of these explanations will refer to the neurobiological
features of psychopathy in order that we can isolate the effect
of making a biological attribution for the behavior. We will now
consider, more broadly, the effect of describing mental conditions
in biological terms.
Biological Attributions
Belief in biological explanations of behavior affects the perception
of people suffering from a number of psychiatric disorders
(Hyman, 2007). The comprehension of biological explanations of
mental illnesses depends on the lay solution to the dualistic mind-
body problem (Kendler, 2005). This raises the question of how
lay people might view the brain relative to the mind and how this
could influence the inferences that are drawn from neuroscience.
The effects of biological attributions represent a double-
edged sword (Aspinwall et al., 2012). On one hand, biological
explanations can have positive effects on lay conceptions of
mental disorder. If the disorder is deemed biological, people
may view sufferers of the disorder as less responsible for having
the disorder, thereby blaming and stigmatizing sufferers to
a lesser extent (Corrigan and Watson, 2004). On the other
hand, biological attributions may also have negative effects; a
biological disorder may be viewed as less changeable, also as a
result of the perception that biological causes are uncontrollable.
Consequently, patients, their families and friends may be less
likely to believe in the efficacy of treatment, thereby reducing
any placebo effect of treatment (Angermeyer et al., 2011). Hence
biological attributions represent a double-edged sword.
Lebowitz (2014) reviewed studies assessing the impact of
biological explanations of mental illnesses. Observational studies
indicate that individuals who ascribe their mental illness to
biological causes are more pessimistic about the success of
their treatment. Moreover, belief in biological explanations was
often related to greater stigmatization, given the perception that
biological disorders are unchangeable. In contrast, experimental
studies suggest that pessimistic views about the success of
treatment are reduced when people receive information about
the changeability of biological components of illnesses. However,
individuals who have a mental illness and believe in a biological
explanation of that illness do not show reduced compliance
with treatment programs (Lebowitz, 2014). Consequently, belief
in biological explanation has an impact on how lay people
perceive their own psychiatric disorders and on others, thus
having an effect on perceived blame for the condition and thereby
potentially influencing treatment success.
Advances in Science Communication
Today neuroscience appears to be particularly popular in
the public eye as a means of explaining behavior. Indeed,
evidence suggests that people find explanations of behavior
more persuasive if those explanations feature circular references
to the brain (Weisberg et al., 2008; Fernandez-Duque et al.,
2015). Given its capacity to explain multiple aspects of the mind
in a seemingly objective way, people have increasingly sought
neuroscientific explanations of complex behaviors (Satel and
Lilienfeld, 2015). The term ‘neuromania’ describes the tendency
of the public to place greater faith in psychological explanations
that are supplemented with references to the brain (Legrenzi and
UmiltaÌ, 2011). Given its power to draw attention to scientific
explanations of behavior, neuroscience could indeed be presented
in various professional settings, such as the criminal justice
system.
In this regard, Greene and Cohen (2004) predict that
neurobiological explanations of criminal behavior will,
and should, change lay attributions of free will and moral
responsibility to offenders by rendering the physical mechanisms
of human behavior more visible. Indeed, our increasing
knowledge of the behavioral consequences of deficits in brain
regions implicated in decision-making, morality and empathy
may 1 day be integrated into the criminal justice system (Umbach
et al., 2015). In accordance with such reasoning, we believe that in
the future, the criminal justice system will be informed by science
that is far more advanced than currently exists. Specifically, we
predict that one day offenders may receive direct personalized
feedback regarding the presence or absence of cognitive, genetic
and neurobiological predictors of different mental illnesses and
criminal behaviors. This may be useful in multiple contexts, such
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as prior to receiving a sentence in court and upon entering and
departing prison grounds. For instance, criminal psychopaths
could be shown how certain parts of their brain, specifically the
limbic structures, exhibit less affect-related activity (Kiehl et al.,
2001). Such procedures would grant offenders an understanding
of the otherwise hidden scientific reasons behind their criminal
behavior.
Given the practical and ethical issues implicated in measuring
the response of real offenders to personalized scientific feedback,
in our study, we are interested in analyzing how lay people
respond to such feedback. In the current age of technology,
social media has generated major new opportunities to analyze
behavior online; in particular, by capturing the so-called ‘digital
footprints’ left by millions of people on social networks. Using
these sources of big data, researchers are generating opportunities
for people to receive personalized data-driven feedback about
their psychological and physical health. For example, Kosinski
et al. (2015) analyzed the data of millions of Facebook users to
create an algorithm capable of predicting users’ gender, sexuality,
age, personal interests and political views, only based on their
Facebook profiles (including statuses, likes, etc). Such algorithms
have also been used to identify the possible psychopathic traits of
ordinary people (Garcia and Sikström, 2014).
The method of the current study is based on this idea that
trait information can be inferred from an individual’s Facebook
profile. Specifically, participants will be given false feedback
about having high or low psychopathic traits after entering their
Facebook login details; the effect of providing such feedback
on their moral behavior will then be measured. If individual
scientific feedback is capable of changing the moral behavior of
lay people, one might also expect this feedback to influence the
moral behavior of offenders who receive such feedback in the
future. Hence the findings of our study will pose implications for
the real world, in which personalized neuroscience might one day
influence how offenders are treated after trial, how offenders
explain their own criminal behavior and therefore their own
likelihood of reoffending (Maruna and Copes, 2005).
The Impact of Belief in Free Will on
Behavior
Previous research has shown that attributions of free will
can influence behavior on many different levels: studies have
documented effects of belief in free will versus disbelief in free
will on well-being (Crescioni et al., 2015), self-control (Rigoni
et al., 2012), cheating (Vohs and Schooler, 2008), aggression
(Baumeister et al., 2009) or conformity (Alquist et al., 2013).
Therefore, belief in free will poses important implications for how
people behave. Hence, we will begin this section by considering
the behavioral consequences of adopting different perspectives on
the causes of behavior, where neuroscience could induce a change
in such perspectives.
Mindsets
In order to contextualize the hypothesized effects of attributions
for psychopathy, we draw upon the analogy of attributions for
intelligence, which have received far more empirical attention. In
the study of intelligence, two different views about the nature of
intelligence have emerged: the view of intelligence as a fixed part
of a person’s personality that cannot be changed, and the view
of intelligence as incremental (i.e., as always having the potential
to be improved through exercise and effort). Dweck (1999)
labeled these implicit theories as ‘growth’ and ‘fixed’ mindsets (or
incremental theory and entity theory), and applied these theories
to her research in self-theories, motivation, and personality.
A growth mindset refers to the belief that a person’s abilities
are not predetermined, but can develop, improve and change over
time through practice. In contrast, the ‘fixed mindset’ implies
that a person’s abilities are static and cannot be changed as they
are predetermined. These terms can be linked to the concepts
of determinism and free will: a growth mindset implies the
potential to change through the exercise of free will or a change
in environments, whereas a fixed mindset implies belief in genetic
and fatalistic determinism, such that any conscious motivation to
change is futile.
Whether people believe in growth or fixed mindsets poses
important implications for their behavior: inducing a growth
mindset as compared to a fixed mindset greatly influences
people’s levels of intrinsic motivation (Dweck, 1999, 2006).
Dweck’s studies indicated, for example, that people who learnt
about growth mindsets reacted in a far more positive way to
failures than people who were taught about fixed mindsets. While
those with a belief in the growth mindset used their failure as
a reason and motivation to improve in the future, those with a
belief in a fixed mindset reacted in a much more negative way.
Specifically, those with the fixed mindset belief blamed others
for their failure, made excuses or even became depressed; as they
believed that their abilities were predetermined and could not be
changed over time. Hence, it appears that the way in which people
respond to feedback about their learning depends on the extent to
which they perceive intelligence to be controllable.
Similarly, we hypothesize that the way in which people
respond to feedback about their psychopathic traits depends
on the extent to which they perceive psychopathic traits to
be controllable. Participants will read either a neurobiological
or a cognitive description of their psychopathic traits. We
hypothesize that the neurobiological explanation of psychopathy
will undermine the perception that psychopathic traits are
controllable and therefore undermine the perceived moral
responsibility of the participant. In the terms of Dweck (1999), we
expect the neurobiological and cognitive attributions respectively
to promote a fixed (uncontrollable) and growth (controllable)
mindset toward psychopathic traits.
The effect of neuroscience communication on attributions
of control and moral responsibility to the self has yet to
be tested. Hence our predictions are based on the emerging
body of research that considers the impact of neuroscience
communication on attributions of moral responsibility to
other people. Specifically, researchers have tested the effect
of describing mental illnesses in neurobiological terms on
the attributions of moral responsibility to criminal behaviors
that are related to those illnesses. In mock court scenarios,
people attribute less moral responsibility to an offender whose
mental illness is described in neurobiological, rather than
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solely cognitive, terms (Gurley and Marcus, 2008; Greene and
Cahill, 2011; Schweitzer et al., 2011; Schweitzer and Saks, 2011;
Aspinwall et al., 2012).
The net mitigating effect of neuroscience has also been found
with real judges engaged in mock sentencing (Aspinwall et al.,
2012) and real sentencing (Denno, 2015). Similarly, students
recommend shorter prison sentences for a mock offender after
taking a cognitive neuroscience module and after reading an
article about brain stimulation or the neuroscientific predictors
of conscious intent (Shariff et al., 2014). Collectively this
research lends support to Greene and Cohen’s (2004) prediction:
people may recognize neurobiological dispositions to offend as
undermining the culpability of offenders and their deservingness
of punishment, unlike social dispositions to offend (Dar-Nimrod
and Heine, 2011).
Researchers have considered the effects of presenting
neuroscience not only as an explanation for the mental
illness inflicting a particular defendant but also as a complete
explanation of all behaviors in general (Nahmias et al., 2007).
In this context, far fewer participants believed that people had
free will (and could be held responsible) in the neurobiologically
(relative to cognitively) determined world (38% vs. 85%,
excluding responses of ‘I don’t know’).
As replicated by Nahmias et al. (2005), the vast majority
of participants continued to attribute responsibility to
the cognitively determined actor, thereby demonstrating a
‘compatibilist’ perspective on free will: the philosophical position
that people are morally responsible for their actions even if those
actions are the inevitable outcome of a chain of preceding events
(Kane, 1999). Hence, neuroscience may challenge belief in free
will not by highlighting the chain of preceding causal events
but by suggesting that, as a neurobiological phenomenon, the
cause of behavior must be somewhat unconscious; somewhat
beyond the control of conscious thought. This dualist perception
of neurobiological phenomena as unconscious might grant
neurobiological determinism greater opportunity to challenge
belief in free will than cognitive determinism. In other words,
neuroscience might challenge attributions of responsibility by
reducing the perceived availability or causality of conscious
cognition rather than by promoting belief in determinism. In
respect to our study, therefore, we expect the neurobiological
explanation of psychopathy to reduce belief in free will to a
greater extent than can be explained by any corresponding
increase in the acceptance of determinism.
Regardless of the mechanism, the findings of Nahmias
et al. (2007) suggest that, for judgments of people in general,
neurobiological causation is granted more exculpatory power
than conscious causation. Our study seeks to extend this
finding to perceptions of the self in particular, rather than
people in general, by applying the theory of fixed and growth
mindsets beyond attributions for intelligence to attributions
for psychopathic traits. First, we expect a neurobiological
explanation of psychopathy to promote a fixed mindset toward
psychopathic traits; a perception of psychopathic traits as
uncontrollable, unchangeable and therefore beyond the moral
responsibility of the individual. Second and in contrast, we expect
a cognitive explanation of psychopathy to promote a growth
mindset toward psychopathic traits; a perception of psychopathic
traits as controllable, changeable and therefore within the
moral responsibility of the individual. In order to support the
hypothesis that neuroscience will reduce attributions of moral
responsibility, we will now consider a proposed mediator of this
relationship; that is the effect of neuroscience communication on
how the mind and brain are perceived to relate to each other.
Dualism
Dualism and physicalism are the two opposing philosophical
solutions to the problem of how the mind and the brain
are connected. Dualism corresponds to the belief that mind
and brain are separate, whereas physicalism assumes that the
subjective experience of humans is a function of brain activity.
Forstmann and Burgmer (2015) found that adults intuitively
believe in mind-body dualism and that dualism is the default
mindset of lay people. In the current study, we are interested in
how communicating neuroscience might influence this default
mindset and behaviors that are affected by dualist intuitions.
Since neuroscientific explanations of human behavior assume
that our thinking and thus the mind are represented in the brain,
we predict that neuroscience communication could challenge
intuitive lay belief in dualism.
There is some evidence that whether people believe in
physicalism or dualism poses implications for their choices in
real-life. Specifically, Forstmann et al. (2012) considered the
impact of dualist beliefs on health behaviors: participants who
were primed with dualistic beliefs reported less commitment
to healthy behaviors and made less healthy real-life decisions
compared to participants primed with physicalism. Although
Forstmann et al. (2012) observed that priming physicalist beliefs
promoted healthy behaviors, we predict that physicalism would
actually promote immoral behavior. Their study only documents
the effect of dualism on health behaviors rather than moral
behaviors: eating unhealthy food does not represent an act of
aggression toward oneself and choosing a healthy lunch is not
a moral behavior even though it has implications for one’s well-
being. Forstmann et al. (2012) reason that physicalist beliefs
promote health behaviors through their implication that the state
of the body influences the state of the mind. We do not expect
physicalist beliefs to promote moral behaviors in this way, since
the behaviors measured in our study – cheating and utilitarian
reasoning – bear no implications for bodily health.
Nevertheless, there is another mechanism by which physicalist
beliefs might influence moral behavior. This mechanism
concerns the potential relationship between dualistic beliefs and
belief in free will, where the latter has been found to influence
various forms of behavior linked to morality; those are self-
control (e.g., Rigoni et al., 2012), cheating (e.g., Vohs and
Schooler, 2008), aggression (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2009) and
conformity (Alquist et al., 2013).
There are two mechanisms by which physicalist beliefs could
challenge belief in free will. First, the perception of the mind
as brain activity might highlight the causal chain of events
that generates any behavior: people may more readily represent
brain activity as a closed loop, in which present brain activity
is the necessary and sufficient result of preceding brain activity
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in an unbreakable and inevitable chain of events. In contrast,
people may more readily represent mental activity, in which
present thoughts are not the necessary and sufficient result of
previous thoughts. In other words, physicalism, as promoted by
neuroscience, may illustrate the philosophy of determinism more
effectively than the perception of mental activity independent of
brain activity. Second, the perception of the mind as brain activity
might bolster the belief that the mind – or cognitive influences
on behavior – are largely unconscious and therefore beyond the
control of conscious thought. Given the perceived compatibility
of cognitive, yet not neurobiological, determinism with free will
(Nahmias et al., 2005), we predict the second mechanism to
constitute the means by which dualistic beliefs are reduced in the
current study.
In their study, Forstmann et al. (2012) report preliminary data
indicating that measures of mind-body dualism, free will and
determinism are largely uncorrelated. We find this result most
surprising and in fact predict a positive relationship between
beliefs in dualism and free will. If the brain is conceived to
constitute the mind, causal influences may subsequently appear
to exert their effects beneath the scrutiny of conscious awareness.
Hence we expect belief in physicalism to undermine belief in
free will. Likewise, ‘libertarian views about free will [, that is
belief in an independent free will, are]. . .likely rooted in some
kind of dualism about mind (or soul) and brain’ (Kolber, 2016,
p. 8). Therefore, we conclude that neuroscience could promote
immoral behavior by undermining lay belief in dualism, the
causal contribution of conscious thought and consequently free
will; hence, we now consider the effects of belief in free will on
immoral behavior.
Cheating
In initiating this line of research, Vohs and Schooler (2008)
investigated the relationship between belief in determinism
and cheating behavior. As hypothesized, reading a passage on
neurobiological determinism and the non-existence of free will by
Crick (1994) led to a significant increase in cheating as compared
to the control group. The findings were replicated in a second
study that measured a more proactive form of cheating. However,
the results failed to replicate in a third study that was part of
the collaborative ‘Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological
Science’ project (Open Science Collaboration, 2015).
While cheating will also be measured in our study, we
intend to use a far less explicit means of manipulating belief
in free will than previous research. Specifically, we intend to
manipulate belief in free will by giving participants either a
neurobiological or a cognitive explanation of psychopathic traits.
This approach extends beyond previous research by separating
the two phenomena of determinism and free will rather than
conflating them, as was common in previous manipulations
(e.g., Crick, 1994). The manipulation in our study is also more
representative of the means by which lay belief in free will could
be challenged in the future. People will arguably be informed
increasingly about neuroscience not only in the media but also in
the use of neuroimaging. This could help to inform individuals
about their neurobiological health and to modify brain states
using neurofeedback and brain stimulation.
There is also reason to believe that people will be persuaded
more by neuroscience than the personalized cognitive feedback
that they receive from self-assessment questionnaires today and
the philosophical arguments presented in previous research
(Greene and Cohen, 2004).
In fact, studies have shown that psychological information
appears to be more appealing and salient if accompanied
by additional, and frequently superfluous or irrelevant,
neuroscientific explanations (Weisberg et al., 2008). This
neuroscientific bias is due to lay theories and reverence for the
natural sciences that consequently are regarded more than social
science explanations (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2015).
The current study measures cheating using the ‘die-under-
cup’ task (taken from Shalvi et al., 2012), where people can reap
benefits by misreporting the outcome of a die roll. Certain factors
including number of times the die is rolled, the outcomes of other
rolls, and time pressure, have been shown to increase dishonesty
in this die-roll test (Shalvi et al., 2011, 2012; Gino and Ariely,
2012; Lewis et al., 2012). For our research, the die-under-cup
paradigm is adapted to suit into an online questionnaire and to
include conditions that increase likelihood of dishonesty.
Aggression and Helpfulness
Baumeister et al. (2009) investigated Vohs and Schooler’s (2008)
findings further by assessing the effects of belief/disbelief in free
will on pro- and anti-social behavior in three experiments. In
their research, disbelief in free will increased aggression and
reduced helpfulness, while belief in free will resulted in more
pro-social behavior such as the willingness to help. One might
speculate therefore that promoting belief in free will generates
a greater sense of personal responsibility and accountability
for one’s actions, which arguably promotes socially desirable
behavior. The finding that belief in free will motivates pro-social
behavior is particularly relevant to our research, since we will
test the effects of communicating neuroscientific explanations of
psychopathy on the moral behavior of lay people.
Self-control
Theoretically, telling a person that free will does not exist (directly
or indirectly) could lead to that person being less willing or able
to exercise self-control, which might actually explain the effects
of disbelief in free will on cheating and aggression. If you believe
that you can not control your life in any ultimate way, you may
feel that there is no point in trying to control each of your
actions, including impulses to act immorally. Several studies now
confirm the idea that belief in free will is linked to self-control,
both when operationalized at the levels of conscious perceptions
and preconscious neural activity. In one study, weakening belief
in free will reduced both perceived self-control and intentional
inhibition (Rigoni et al., 2012). The authors interpreted these
results as indicating that reduced self-control could be the
mechanism by which disbelief in free will leads to antisocial
tendencies.
The finding that disbelief in free will reduces self-control
has also been documented at the level of basic neurocognitive
processes. In one study, inducing disbelief in free will attenuated
neural reactions to error, which are implicated in the very early
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 294
fpsyg-08-00294 March 11, 2017 Time: 13:54 # 7
Blakey et al. Communicating the Neuroscience of Psychopathy
phases of exerting self-control (Rigoni et al., 2015). Moreover,
brain correlates of preconscious motor preparation were shown
in the first study to be altered by inducing a belief in determinism,
as compared to a belief in free will (Rigoni et al., 2012). In
the context of the current study, self-control at the behavioral
level will be included as a potential mechanism by which the
manipulation influences moral reasoning and cheating.
Conformity
While disbelief in free will may reduce self-control, it may
increase social control; that is the influence that other people have
on the behavior one exhibits. Indeed, research by Alquist et al.
(2013) has shown that independently, less belief in free will and
greater belief in determinism resulted in greater conformity to the
judgments of other participants. It was suggested that a belief in
free will contributes to more autonomous decisions and actions
and therefore less conformity (to group norms).
This finding bears relevance to our online study, since
participants will be provided with a supposedly scientific
judgment about their degree of psychopathic traits. Different
participants may conform to this judgment of themselves to
differing extents; some participants may exhibit the psychopathic
tendencies that they are described as having, while others
may not. Given its expected effect on belief in free will, the
neurobiological explanation of psychopathy might promote the
conformity of participants to the psychopathy feedback. In
contrast, since we do not expect the cognitive explanation
of psychopathy to challenge belief in free will, participants
who read this explanation may conform less to the feedback
about their degree of psychopathy. Therefore, by reducing
belief in free will, neuroscience may increase the receptivity
of participants to external opinions, including the personalized
science that we present. Hence, the persuasiveness of the opinion
represents an additional factor that could explain the greater
effect of neuroscience. We intend to capture and control for this
effect by measuring the perceived believability of the presented
explanations of psychopathy; the neurobiological explanation is
hypothesized to be more believable.
Summary and Hypotheses
Considering all of the above, there are three ways in which our
study will add to the literature in this field. First, we will be testing
the effects of specifically presenting neuroscience to lay people,
rather than a generic passage about free will and determinism
(e.g., Vohs and Schooler, 2008). Second, we will be looking at
the effects of presenting neuroscience to explain a particular set
of traits – psychopathic traits – among lay people rather than
presenting explanations of a mental illness in a clinical population
(see Lebowitz, 2014). Third, our study will examine the effects of
providing personal feedback about psychopathic traits that was
allegedly generated from a digital footprint (i.e., Facebook ‘likes’)
rather than a survey measure of psychopathy.
The field study and the online study bear relations to each
other, since our field study will test whether the public are
sensitive to the hypotheses we propose for the online study. While
the online study tests how the communication of the basis of
psychopathy affects moral behavior, the field study is intended to
capture the general public’s attitudes toward this communication.
This will be done using the lost-letter technique, comparing
return rates of postcards describing neurobiological or cognitive
explanations of criminal behavior intended for prisoners or
non-prisoners. We hypothesize that people will be sensitive to the
potential negative behavioral consequences of communicating a
neurobiological explanation of criminal behavior, as reflected by
reduced return rates of the postcards. Specifically, we predict the
return rate, indicating endorsement of the postcard’s content, to
be higher for the cognitive (than neurobiological) explanation
(Hypothesis 1) and higher in the non-prisoner (than the prisoner)
condition (Hypothesis 2), and that these effects will interact
(Hypothesis 3). Lay people may anticipate that neurobiological
explanations of behavior undermine attributions of responsibility
and hence seek to avoid the communication of neuroscience to
offenders.
In comparison, the online study will measure whether this
anticipation is justified; specifically, whether feedback about the
neurobiological or cognitive psychopathic traits (specifically the
strength of their moral alarm) of the participant influences
utilitarian reasoning in moral dilemmas and dishonesty in a die-
under-cup test, and whether this is mediated by self-control, and
beliefs in dualism, free will and determinism. We hypothesize that
participants who are led to believe they have a weak moral alarm
(associated with higher levels of psychopathy) will act in ways
consistent with psychopathic tendencies, i.e., use more utilitarian
reasoning and cheat more (Hypothesis 4), especially after reading
a neurobiological explanation of psychopathy (Hypothesis 5).
Our final hypothesis (Hypothesis 6) is that our manipulation
will influence self-control and belief in dualism, free will, and
determinism, and that these will mediate the relationships
outlined in Hypotheses 4 and 5.
STUDY 1 – FIELD STUDY
Materials and Equipments
The Lost Letter Technique
The lost letter technique (LLT) was first adopted by Merritt and
Fowler (1948) as a means of assessing the public’s attitudinal
approach to an undelivered letter (Stern and Faber, 1997). By
distributing a large number of apparently lost letters referring
to a particular topic, the return rate of the letters can be used
to measure the public’s compliance with such issue (Milgram
et al., 1965). This method has been deemed as valid and can
be implemented conveniently: participants are unaware of their
participation in this unique sociological survey, whereby natural
behaviors are recorded, possibly reflecting concrete attitudes
(Milgram et al., 1965; Cahill and Sherrets, 1979). This technique
will be used to evaluate the public’s approval of disseminating
the neuroscience of criminal behavior to both lay people and
prisoners.
Stepwise Procedures
Participants
Data will be collected from the responses given by a convenience
sample of participants, whereby no recruitment or selection
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criteria is required. Therefore, age and gender and other
individual factors cannot be selected. Those who decide to pick
up a lost postcard and either mail, ignore or purposely destroy it
will be considered participants (Milgram et al., 1965). As this field
study is non-obtrusive, the number of participants taking part in
the study cannot be determined. However, 832 postcards will be
scattered around the city streets, thus authorizing approximately
the same number of people to unconsciously take part in the
study. This sample size is sufficiently large given the moderate
response rates recorded by prior research; for example, from
37% in poorer neighborhoods to 87% in richer neighborhoods
(Holland et al., 2012).
Ethics Statement
The study has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the
University of Oxford, and is fully compliant with the Declaration
of Helsinki.
Design and Procedure
A total of 832 printed, stamped and addressed postcards will be
dropped throughout London. This large number of postcards
will be dropped to increase the probability of gathering a large
number of participants, thus increasing the sensitivity of the
measure to the independent variable and the reliability of the
obtained results (Milgram, 1969; Cherulnik, 1975). The postcards
will be distributed face-up in proximity of parked cars, in shops
and on pavements throughout a random selection of London
boroughs.
Boroughs of London
The 832 postcards will be distributed in boroughs of London
with different socio-economic status (SES) by four members of
the research team. The SES of the borough will be calculated
from the combined average degree of inequality, homelessness,
housing quality, unemployment, income, benefits, and education
(Trust for London and New Policy Institute, 2017). Within each
of the four categories of SES, postcards will be distributed in the
following boroughs:
Poorest: Barking and Dagenham, Newham, Brent, Ealing
Poor: Enfield, Haringey, Waltham Forest, Lewisham
Rich: Hackney, Southwark, Tower Hamlets, Croydon
Richest: Islington, Lambeth, Camden, Kensington and
Chelsea, Merton
Distribution Process
Two hundred and eight postcards will be distributed in the
poorest, 208 in poor, 208 in rich, and 208 in the richest
boroughs. This decision has been made with the aim of reducing
the probability of reaching a floor or ceiling effect of the
manipulation: if the return rate is already high or low as a
result of the borough SES (Holland et al., 2012; Table 1B; Kraus
and Keltner, 2013), the scope for our manipulation to exert a
supplementary effect may be limited. Therefore, we will distribute
the postcards in boroughs of differing SES to ensure there
remains this scope for the manipulation, while also increasing the
generalisability of the findings from a more representative sample
of boroughs.
The distribution will take place on 4 days (Monday, Tuesday,
Thursday, and Friday) across four different time slots, such that
each of the distributors will drop 208 postcards (52 per day of
all four types of postcards). Each distributor will rotate through
the four conditions, such that postcard type B is dropped after
type A, C after B, D after C, A after D etc. On Monday the
distribution will take place at 9–11 am, on Tuesday at 11 am-
1 pm, on Thursday at 1–3 pm and on Friday 3–5 pm. A day
of distribution will, however, be skipped until the following
weekday if it is raining, since rainy weather could severely reduce
the response rate. The distributors will drop the postcards on
the same days and at the same times so that any effects of
external factors between boroughs (e.g., the weather, time of
day) are minimal. Thus, one person will distribute the postcards
in one of the poorest boroughs, the second person in a poor
borough, the third person in a rich borough, and the fourth
person in one of the richest boroughs. On the second day the
first person will distribute the postcards in a poor borough,
the second person in a rich borough, the third person in one
of the richest boroughs, and the fourth person in one of the
poorest boroughs etc. Consequently, every distributor will drop
postcards in every category of SES. No borough will be visited
twice.
In the process of distribution the distributors will drop the
postcards not too close to each other so that one person will not
find two postcards. Furthermore, the distributors will drop the
postcards in place that are visible and accessible to the general
public so that the postcards can be found easily. In addition, the
postcards will be dropped carefully and secretly.
Content
The postcards will be addressed to a PO BOX address (to
avoid the use of a real traceable address), with the manipulation
bolstered by supplementing the first line of this address with the
‘Organisation for Educating Prisoners/Students in Crime.’ All
postcards will have the same front cover, as to avoid different
images or colors biasing the participant’s subsequent response.
An exception will be made for the front-cover wording, in so
far as brain-based postcards will contain the emboldened word
“brain,” and mind-based ones will contain the emboldened word
TABLE 1A | Conditions of the field study.
Non-prisoner Prisoner
Brain-based 208 208
Mind-based 208 208
TABLE 1B | Total number of dispersed postcards in London boroughs.
Poor Mildly
poor
Mildly
rich
Rich Total
Brain-based to non-prisoner 52 52 52 52 208
Brain-based to prisoner 52 52 52 52 208
Mind-based to non-prisoner 52 52 52 52 208
Mind-based to prisoner 52 52 52 52 208
Total 208 208 208 208 832
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“the person”. Thus far, research has documented only that adults
do not perceive specific mental traits (e.g., memory) to be entirely
physical (Forstmann and Burgmer, 2015). This suggests that
people perceive ‘the person’ to consist of physical and non-
physical causes of behavior. It remains possible, however, that the
same people still equate the linguistic labels of ‘mind’ and ‘brain’.
So people may be more dualistic in their implicit beliefs (when
judging specific traits) than in their explicit beliefs (when judging
‘the mind’ as a concrete label). Since this study intended to test
the effects of dualistic reasoning, the manipulation was designed
to engage implicit beliefs about the person as a whole, rather than
explicit beliefs about ‘the mind’. Hence the manipulation was
oriented around ‘the person’. Therefore, this difference will guide
subjects in understanding the explanations given in the postcard.
The main body of the postcard will comprise a brief
description detailing the causes of criminal behavior, written by
an imaginary person who has supposedly bought the postcard
as part of a scientific campaign, the latter aiming to spread
a particular message about the causes of criminal behavior.
Half of the postcards will present a neurobiological (brain-
based) explanation of criminal behavior (see Appendix), while
the rest will present a cognitive (mind-based) explanation (see
Appendix). Additionally, 50% of the postcards will be directed
to prisoners (see Appendix), while the remaining half will be
directed to non-prisoners (see Appendix). In both cases, the
recipient will be an alleged friend of the writer. The writer
will ask his friend to pass the postcard onto the ‘prisoners’
or (non-imprisoned) ‘students’ that he supposedly teaches. By
comparing the response rates of all four conditions, one may infer
different evaluations and conclusions about how neuroscientific
and cognitive descriptions of criminal behavior influence the
public’s decision to spread such information.
Consequently, participants will be randomly divided into four
conditions, depending on the type of information and recipient
reported on their postcard (Table 1A). As a result, a total of 208
postcards will be dispersed for each condition. This sample size
was selected on the basis of power analysis assuming a normal
distribution of the data (the power calculator we used can be
found at https://www.stat.ubc.ca/~rollin/stats/ssize/n2.html). In
this independent-samples analysis, we set the probability of Type
I error to 5% and the probability of Type II error to 20%, and
assumed that the effect size would be small (Cohen’s d = 0.2).
Proposed Analysis and Anticipated Results
Statistical analysis will involve analyzing the response rates of
all four conditions and so binary data (did not return the
postcard = 0; returned the postcard = 1) will be collected. We
expect to obtain an explanation effect supporting Hypothesis
1, by which a larger number of mind-based postcards than
brain-based ones will be posted. A chi-square test of association
will determine any significant differences between observed
and expected response rates: χ2 (1, N = number of returned
postcards) > 3.841, p < 0.05 (Tables 2A,B). Furthermore, an
effect of the recipient is predicted, whereby we expect to receive
a larger number of postcards addressed to non-prisoners than
prisoner, supporting Hypothesis 2 (Tables 3A,B). A second chi-
square test of association will be carried out to assess whether
TABLE 2A | Expected frequencies of returned postcards due to given
explanation.
Chi-square test of association: Expected frequencies (hypothetical
N = 400) in returned mind-based and brain-based postcards
Mind-based Brain-based Total
Returned postcards 200 200 400
TABLE 2B | Observed frequencies of returned postcards.
Hypothetical Chi-square test of association: Observed frequencies
(hypothetical N = 400) in returned mind-based and brain-based
postcards
Mind-based Brain-based Total
Returned postcards 300 100 400
TABLE 3A | Expected frequencies of returned postcards due to receiver.
Hypothetical Chi-square test of association: Expected frequencies
(hypothetical N = 400) in returned non-prisoner and prisoner addressed
postcards
Non-prisoner Prisoner Total
Returned postcards 200 200 400
TABLE 3B | Observed frequencies of returned postcards due to receiver.
Hypothetical Chi-square test of association: Observed frequencies
(hypothetical N = 400) in returned non-prisoner and prisoner addressed
postcards
Non-prisoner Prisoner Total
Returned postcards 300 100 400
such difference in returned postcards exists: χ2 (1, N = number
of returned postcards) > 3.841 p < 0.05. In particular, an
interaction effect is expected, whereby we expect the effect of the
recipient to be particularly strong for the brain-based postcards
(Hypothesis 3). Therefore, we predict a larger difference between
non-prisoners and prisoners in the brain-based condition than in
the mind-based condition (Tables 4A,B). The software IBM SPSS
Statistics Version 23.0 will be employed.
Limitations
The LLT has a number of limitations. First, one might question
whether the technique is sufficiently sensitive to document
subtle manipulations. For the manipulation to be successful,
participants must attend to the address and text on the postcard
and their decision to return the postcard (or not) must reflect
their approval of this specific message. The participants, however,
might not pay sufficient attention to the manipulation.
Second, even more so that the online study, the field
study cannot document the mechanisms that mediate the
decision to return the postcard. Whilst we interpret the return
rate as indicating the degree of acceptance for the presented
explanation of offending, the return rate will also be sensitive
to unpredictable events (e.g., street cleaners who throw away
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TABLE 4A | Interaction effect of expected frequencies of returned
postcards.
Hypothetical Chi-square of contingency tables: Expected frequencies
(hypothetical N = 400)
Non-prisoner Prisoner Total
Mind-based 100 100 200
Brain-based 100 100 200
Total 200 200 400
TABLE 4B | Interaction effect of observed frequencies of returned
postcards.
Hypothetical Chi-square of contingency tables: Observed frequencies
(hypothetical N = 400)
Non-prisoner Prisoner Total
Mind-based 215 85 300
Brain-based 85 15 100
Total 300 100 400
different numbers of postcards of different conditions). We
aim to overcome this problem by implementing a strict
plan for dropping the postcards: each distributor will rotate
between dropping cards from all four conditions in boroughs
of every SES category at all dropping times, spread across
the day (see distribution of postcards). Nevertheless, the
LLT has been shown to be reliable (Milgram et al., 1965;
Cherulnik, 1975). In addition, we have chosen to feature
relatively extreme statements on the postcards in order to
strengthen our manipulation. Thus this explicit manipulation
may be strong, especially since participants will be unaware of
their participation, thereby removing potentially overshadowing
Hawthorne effects.
STUDY 2 – ONLINE STUDY
Materials/Equipment
Neurobiological vs. Cognitive Manipulation
Our manipulation was adapted to focus on a neurobiological vs.
cognitive understanding of psychopathy, based on a study by
Aspinwall et al. (2012) where the explanation of psychopathy
was drawn from James Blair’s neurocognitive model (Blair,
2006). We removed any direct references to genetics from
the original stimuli to increase the scientific equivalence of
the two explanations. The neurobiological details in the brain-
based explanation were deliberately superfluous; in reality, these
details contributed very little substance to the argument. This
decision was based on findings that superfluous neuroscience
increases the perceived credibility of psychological science, even
when the neuroscience itself is a circular repetition of the
psychological science (Weisberg et al., 2008). Here, we present
the material for the two conditions in the same paragraphs,
emphasizing the equivalence of the conditions independent of the
manipulation:
The brain’s/mind’s moral alarm
Here, we present the material for the two conditions in the
same paragraphs, emphasizing the equivalence of the conditions
independent of the manipulation: Extensive research shows
that human brains/minds have a moral alarm. The moral
alarm is the physical/psychological system that produces feelings
of anxiety when you behave badly. When humans behave
badly, their brain/mind normally generates particular electrical
signals and chemical reactions/thoughts and emotions that
produce feelings of anxiety. The purpose of this anxiety is to
physically/psychologically reduce your desire to behave badly."
Your brain/mind
We would now like to tell you more about people like you, who
have an 18-22% stronger/weaker moral alarm than the average
person.
The moral alarm is the physical/psychological system in the
brain/mind that produces feelings of anxiety when you behave
badly. The purpose of this anxiety is to physically/psychologically
reduce your desire to behave badly. Since your moral alarm is
18–22% stronger/weaker than the average moral alarm, you are
18-22% less/more likely to behave badly than the average person.
This is true of anyone with an 18–22%stronger/weaker moral
alarm.
People have moral alarms of different strengths because of
physical/psychological differences in how their brains/minds
work. When people with a brain/mind like yours behave badly,
their brain/mind generates more/less of the electrical signals and
chemical reactions/thoughts and emotions that produce feelings
of anxiety.
Therefore, people with a brain/mind like yours feel 18–22%
more/less anxious when they behave badly. Consequently, people
with a brain/mind like yours are 18-22% less/more likely to
behave badly.
The Short Dark Triad Scale
The Short Dark Triad scale (SD3; Jones and Paulhus, 2014) is a
brief measure of three socially aversive traits – Machiavellianism,
narcissism and psychopathy. The whole scale normally consists
of 27 items, rated on a five-point scale from 1 (disagree strongly)
to 5 (strongly agree). As we are only interested in one element
of the dark triad constellation, psychopathy, we will only use the
psychopathy subscale of this instrument. This subscale includes 9
items (e.g., “Payback needs to be quick and nasty”) and provides
an efficient, valid and reliable way of measuring psychopathy,
with Cronbach’s alpha ranging somewhere from 0.77 to 0.79
(Buckels et al., 2014; Jones and Paulhus, 2014). This scale will be
used to assess the participants’ real psychopathic traits.
The Dualism Scale
We will measure dualistic beliefs with a modified version of the
thought experiment used by Forstmann and Burgmer (2015).
Participants are asked to imagine that scientists have developed
a device capable of duplicating any person in a matter of seconds,
using highly advanced technology. Participants are told that after
placing a person into a chamber, a computer scans the entire
person (i.e., the entire content of the chamber), its every molecule
and atom, and stores the information digitally. The information
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is then used to recreate the scanned person from basic chemical
elements in a second chamber, resulting in a 100% identical copy
of the scanned object, with a 100% success rate. In contrast to
the original task, our participants will be asked to imagine that
they are placed in the first chamber and are duplicated. After the
process is complete and a 100% perfect duplicate emerges, the
participants will indicate on 7-point Likert-type scales ranging
from ‘definitely no’ to ‘definitely yes’ the extent to which six
properties of themselves also describe their duplicate. Three of
the properties will be mental and relate to the manipulation text,
e.g., “Is the moral alarm in your duplicate the same strength as the
moral alarm in you?”. The remaining three items will be physical,
e.g., “Does your duplicate have the same eye color as you?”. If
people do separate minds from bodies, there will be a difference
in the mental and physical properties ascribed to the duplicate.
The Determinism Subscale
The Determinism subscale of the Free Will Inventory
(Nadelhoffer et al., 2014) consists of five items that make
different deterministic statements. For example, “Every event
that has ever occurred, including human decisions and actions,
was completely determined by prior events.” Participants are
asked to rate their agreement on a seven-point Likert rating scale
with anchors ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree). The Determinism subscale has an acceptable to good
internal consistency, with Cronbach’s α = 0.772 (Nadelhoffer
et al., 2014).
The Free Will Subscale
The Free Will subscale of the Free Will Inventory (Nadelhoffer
et al., 2014) consists of five items stating in different ways that
free will exists. For example, one of the items states that “People
ultimately have complete control over their decisions and their
actions.” The scale was chosen over the FAD+ scale (Paulhus and
Carey, 2011) because it avoids religious terms. Participants are
asked to score each item on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree). This subscale has a good internal consistency,
with Cronbach’s α= 0.803 (Nadelhoffer et al., 2014).
Die-under-Cup Measure of Dishonesty
Dishonesty/cheating will be measured using an online version of
the die-under-cup test (Shalvi et al., 2011). Participants will be
asked to press the ‘next page’ button to roll a virtual die within
the online questionnaire in place of the physical die and cup. The
‘die’ will be rolled three times, the results of which will be fixed
to show a two, a six, and a three respectively. Participants will
report the first outcome by typing the number into a box and this
response must be made within a 30 s window. The die-under-
the-cup appears to be a valid measure of dishonesty, as found in a
study conducted by Halevy et al. (2013), whereby high scores on
this task are caused by the participant cheating rather than luck.
Crying Baby Dilemma
The crying baby dilemma (Greene et al., 2001) involves
participants deciding how to behave with their child when enemy
soldiers have taken over their village. In order to save their own
lives and every village townspeople’s lives, they must smother
their crying baby to death, in order to avoid the attention of
the enemy soldiers. Alternatively, saving the child would mean
putting the whole village at risk and letting all townspeople face
death.
Standard Trolley Dilemma
The standard trolley dilemma (Foot, 1978) involves the
participant being at the wheel of a runaway trolley. The latter is
approaching a track, at the end of which five railway workmen
are standing. Participants are given the option to switch a lever
on the dashboard so that the trolley proceeds off toward a right-
hand track, where only one workman is standing. The participant
is left to decide whether to take no responsibility for the situation
and let the trolley proceed straight toward the five men, or change
the trolley’s direction in order to save as many lives as possible.
Footbridge Dilemma
In the Footbridge dilemma (Thomson, 1985) a personal moral
violation can be authorized in order to justify a precise
utilitarian reasoning (Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006). Individuals
are presented with a scenario in which a trolley is moving toward
five workmen who have no way to escape. The participants are
asked to imagine that they are on a footbridge next to a large
stranger, whom they may push off the bridge in order to stop
the trolley from hitting the five workmen. By doing so, only one
person would be actively killed and five people would be saved.
Through a replication of the study by Greene et al. (2001), this
task has been demonstrated to measure a different construct to
personal moral dilemmas (Nakamura, 2013).
Utilitarian reasoning will be assessed by administering
participants all three moral dilemmas.
Stepwise Procedures
Participants
Participants will be recruited through adverts for the study
posted on social media sites, such as Facebook. We will also
contact universities in Austria, Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Finland,
Norway, and the UK to promote the online study to their English-
speaking students. Therefore, both students and members of the
public aged 18 years of age or older will be able to take part in our
study. The participants must be able to speak and comprehend
English in order to fully understand all the information presented
to them. Hence, we will ask participants to rate their English
competence before completing the study. As we expect a small
effect size, we aim to recruit at least 800 participants. This sample
size was selected on the basis of power analysis. In this analysis,
we set the probability of Type I error to 5% and the probability of
Type II error to 20%, and assumed that the effect size would be
small (Cohen’s d= 0.2). Upon completing the study, participants
will be entered into a lottery, giving them the chance to win a sum
of money ranging from €75 – €200.
Ethics Statement
The study has been submitted to the Ethics Committee of the
University of Oxford, and is fully compliant with the Declaration
of Helsinki.
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FIGURE 1 | Stepwise procedure of the online study
Design and Procedure
Participants will be asked to complete a series of online tasks in
a single session (see Figure 1), administered via the Qualtrics
platform. The online study will be divided into three sections, in
order to facilitate the completion and understanding of the study.
They will firstly be instructed that the purpose of this study is
to investigate different ways of measuring personality traits, thus
comparing traditional and newly developed means of measuring
a certain psychopathic trait, specifically normal variation in the
anxiety people feel when committing an immoral act. In addition,
an abbreviated online version of the Short Dark Triad (SD3)
will be administered to determine participants’ psychopathic
traits. We will therefore be able to compare the influence of
actual psychopathy with the influence of the false feedback about
psychopathy presented to each participant.
In the second part of the online study, participants will be
given either a cognitive or a neurobiological explanation of moral
alarm; that is the anxiety produced during immoral behavior.
This description will explain the function of the moral alarm
in producing feelings of anxiety when people behave badly.
A single multiple choice question will be included at the end
of the description, in order to make sure that participants
are reading thoroughly the online questionnaire and that our
manipulations are effective. Participants will also be informed
of why it is difficult to assess the moral alarm through a self-
report questionnaire, thus justifying the purpose of the Facebook
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analysis. Again, a single multiple choice question will assess their
understanding of the information given.
As a way of persuading participants that assessing moral alarm
through online personal data is valid and reliable, they will all
be asked to watch an online video reviewing Kosinski’s research
(Kosinski et al., 2013) into the prediction of personality traits
from digital footprints. The video will consider how researchers
can predict personality traits, intelligence, ethnicity, political
views and in particular psychopathic traits, by simply taking into
account Facebook likes. A question measuring their accuracy
in comprehending the text given to them will also be included.
Accordingly, participants will be asked to provide a shortened
link (through URL shortener) of their Facebook account for the
purpose of analyzing their Facebook likes. None of the entered
login details will be saved.
After entering their shortened URL to their Facebook page,
participants will receive false feedback about their psychopathic
traits. Note these traits will be described without actually referring
to psychopathy in order to avoid triggering the popular negative
perception of psychopathy. Specifically, participants will be
randomly allocated to read one of four types of feedback: half
of the participants will read that they have a 18–22% weaker-
than-average moral alarm, while the other half will read that they
have a 18–22% stronger-than-average moral alarm. Additionally,
within each of these groups, half of the feedback messages will
refer to a neurobiological (brain-based) explanation of moral
alarm, while the remaining half will refer to a cognitive (mind-
based) explanation of moral alarm. Both types of explanations
were adapted from a subsection of the explanations presented by
Aspinwall et al. (2012), who illustrated the power of biological
explanations of psychopathic behavior, including moral alarm,
to shape the sentencing decisions of judges. In sum, participants
will read one of four different types of feedback that differ along
two dimensions: the degree of personal moral alarm and the
neurobiological or cognitive nature of this trait.
The third section of the study will require participants to
complete a series of brief tasks. The measurements for the
mediators and dependent variables will be counterbalanced.
Therefore, half of the participants will complete the (randomly
ordered) mediators, followed by the (randomly ordered)
dependent variables. Additionally half of the participants
will complete the (randomly ordered) dependent variables
followed by the (randomly ordered) mediators. Consequently,
the participants will complete scales intended to measure the
proposed mediators, that is the Determinism Subscale, the Free
Will Subscale of the Free Will Inventory, and a measure of
dualistic beliefs.
Subsequently, self-control will be measured through a
modified online version of the famous marshmallow test (Mischel
et al., 1972). As all participants will be entered into a final
lottery, they will be asked when they would prefer to discover the
outcome of the draw. They will have the choice to either find out
immediately after the completion of the study if they have won
their specific amount of money, or whether they would prefer to
receive an increment of €100 but wait 3 months to find out the
lottery’s outcomes. Participants will be given the measure of belief
in dualism. This measure concerns a futuristic device that enables
scientists to precisely duplicate any person; participants are asked
to answer questions about their hypothetical duplicate.
Participants will also be required to respond to three different
moral dilemmas designed to measure utilitarian reasoning: the
difficult personal dilemma, the easy personal dilemma and the
impersonal dilemma. For the first type of dilemma, we will
use the crying baby dilemma. The footbridge dilemma will be
used to test the easy moral dilemma, while the standard trolley
dilemma will be administered in order to test the impersonal
dilemma. All three dilemmas will be counterbalanced, in order to
avoid any first response interfering or influencing the remaining
responses. At the end of each response, the participants will be
asked whether they felt guilty about their virtual actions, through
a 6-point Likert scale.
The die-under-the-cup test will also be administered to
participants to measure their willingness to lie. They will be asked
to press a button on the screen to roll a die three times to decide
the amount of money they could potentially win. Finally, they will
be asked to select the outcome of their first roll (from 1 to 6) on-
screen; they will be given 30 s to enter the outcome before the
page progresses. Participants will be warned that if they fail to
type the outcome down within 30 s, they will only be awarded the
minimum amount of money. The time limit will be visible from
a ticking counter.
The roll outcome that participants report will determine the
value of the lottery prize: the higher the outcome, the greater the
value of the prize. Hence participants may misreport the outcome
of their first roll in order to increase the value of their potential
prize. In reality, the prize will be fixed at the maximum value. In
order that participants can receive their potential prize for entry
into the lottery, we will lastly ask for their email address. However,
this email address will be stored separately to all other data to
ensure their responses remain anonymous. Finally, participants
will be debriefed about the false feedback.
It is important to note that a counterbalancing procedure will
be included, whereby the tasks measuring self-control, dishonesty
and utilitarian reasoning will be presented in a randomly
generated order. This is important because we hypothesize that
certain conditions, such as the stronger-than-average moral
alarm condition, will promote more inhibitory, honest and
empathic responses on the first measure of any psychopathic
behavior. Consequently, this could reduce the willingness of
participants to exhibit inhibitory, honest and empathic responses
on subsequent measures of these behaviors.
According to moral licensing theory (Merritt et al., 2010),
individuals who show moral behaviors initially, tend to display
immoral, unethical or problematic behaviors later (Blanken et al.,
2015). This may be attributed to the fact that such individuals
feel authorized to award themselves moral credits, believe that
all temptations wear down their self-control, or simply become
desensitized to the thought of cheating. Participants in our
stronger-than-average moral alarm condition may be more likely
to cheat in later tasks than earlier task due to this confounding
effect of moral licensing.
In contrast, we hypothesize that participants who read about
their neurobiologically weak moral alarm may exhibit less
inhibitory, less honest and less empathic responses during initial
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tasks, given the perception that their psychopathic traits are
independent of their free will and are ultimately due to their
brain. Consequently, the very act of behaving immorally may
induce subsequent guilt and remorse, thereby reducing the
perceived appropriateness of continuing to respond immorally.
Therefore, participants may exhibit more moral behaviors in the
later tasks.
For example, participants in the neurobiologically weak moral
alarm condition who first receive the dishonesty task may feel that
cheating is acceptable, given a reduced attribution of their actions
to free will. However, participants may then believe that enough
cheating has been done and therefore respond more morally
in the subsequent tasks, such as the self-control one. In order
to control all these possible outcomes, randomly changing the
order of presentation of these tasks could minimize any possible
confounding effects of completing each task on responses to
subsequent tasks.
Before concluding the study, participants will be asked to
what extent they thought the feedback they had received (i.e.,
the false feedback) was true about themselves. Furthermore, the
participants will be asked to rate the degree to which they believed
the presented explanation of psychopathy was true. Furthermore,
participants will be asked to provide personal demographic
information, including their age, gender, nationality and field of
studies/work. At the end of the study, the participants will be
comprehensively debriefed.
Proposed Analysis and Anticipated Results
We will test our hypotheses using hierarchical multiple
linear regression, according to the recommendations of Hayes
(2013). Hierarchical multiple linear regression is an appropriate
procedure because we want to see how the average values of
the dependent variables change as the independent variable is
varied through our manipulation, while at the same time several
demographic variables are held fixed. Hierarchical regression
was selected instead of multivariate analysis of variance because
we want to test hypotheses of mediation. Hayes’ procedure for
mediation analyses involves bootstrapping confidence intervals
of the indirect effects; this procedure was considered preferable
over the “causal steps” model of Baron and Kenny (1986), due
to several shortcomings of this model (for detailed coverage, see
Hayes, 2013). The software IBM SPSS Statistics Version 23.0 will
be employed. For the mediation analyses, the PROCESS macro
for SPSS will be used1.
Before testing the model, we will check the assumptions of
linear regression. If the observations are normally distributed,
then parametric regression is appropriate. Outliers will be
removed systematically. There will be no missing data points, as
the form does not allow continuing without selecting an option.
Nevertheless, participants may terminate their participation
early: where participants discontinue their participation after at
least one dependent variable has been measured and have not
withdrawn their consent, the data will be used in the analysis of
that particular variable. Categorical dependent variables will be
dummy coded as whole numbers.
1processmacro.org
In the first step of the analysis, the dependent variables
Dishonesty and Utilitarian reasoning 1 (Crying Baby), 2
(Footbridge) and 3 (Trolley) will be entered into the model. Then
the independent variables will be entered in a fixed order of
steps or blocks. In the first block of the hierarchical regression
model, the demographic variables Age, Gender, Nationality and
Education level will be included. This means that these variables
are held constant in the further analyses. In the second block,
the independent variables of Psychopathy and Neuroscience
will be added, first separately and then together; the direct
and interactive effects can be estimated in this manner. Next
the mediation analysis of indirect effects through Free will,
Determinism, Dualism, Guilt and Self-control will be carried out
using the PROCESS macro.
We hypothesize that the dependent variables will be
significantly predicted by the independent variables but also
that the mediation analyses will show significant indirect
effects. Specifically, in accordance with Hypothesis 4, we expect
participants in the weak moral alarm condition to show more
dishonesty and utilitarian reasoning compared to those in
the strong moral alarm condition. We also expect to see a
stronger demonstration of this in the neurobiological explanation
condition (Hypothesis 5). Finally, we expect the indirect effects
observed to support Hypothesis 6, and show that the measures of
free will, dualism, guilt, and self-control mediate the relationships
between the independent and dependent variables.
Limitations
The primary limitation of the online study will be our inability
to identify the precise mechanism of the effects, e.g., which type
of belief in free will has been challenged by the manipulation: a
compatibilist or incompatibilist notion of choice? It is impossible
to control for all the differences between the neurobiological
and cognitive conditions. Specifically, the neurobiological and
cognitive conditions might induce differences in lay perceptions
of the availability and causal efficacy of the conscious mind
over our feelings of moral alarm (compatibilist choice), or
the scope for free will to exist before the brain/mind and
therefore the scope to attribute ultimate control to our actions
(incompatibilist choice). Given a more nuanced understanding
of compatibilist choice, the neurobiological and cognitive
conditions could also induce differences in the lay perception
that the degree of moral alarm experienced is a feature of
our Deep Self – our stable self – or merely our Acting
Self – our temporary self in a particular situation (Sripada,
2009).
This limitation in our ability to specify the mechanism could
only be overcome by measuring more mediators and including
more control conditions, which would be impractical due to
the number of participants and length of survey then required.
Despite having no control condition in which participants
perform all the tasks without reading about their own moral
alarm, we can still establish effects of describing neurobiology
relative to describing cognition – the purpose of our study. Our
goal is to document effects of giving people personal feedback in
neurobiological terms, not to document effects of giving people
personal feedback relative to no feedback. Note, with this design,
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we can still document effects of giving above-average feedback
relative to below-average feedback.
Given the nature of the manipulation, we can only recruit
Facebook users for the online study. Although Facebook is
very widely used, it is more popular among younger (and
other types of) people. The cross-cultural design of our study,
however, promotes the generalisability of our findings in a
different direction: across the countries. In order to assess
the generalisability of our sample, we are of course collecting
demographic information in order to know if and how our
sample could be biased.
One might also contest whether our findings can be
generalized to real life examples of immoral behavior, since, for
example, cheating was only measured online and people are more
likely to lie online (Naquin et al., 2010). On the other hand, the
potential for the researcher to record cheating is clearer online –
this potential might therefore discourage cheating. Consequently,
there is also reason to suggest the cheating observed online may
not be any more frequent than the cheating observed face-to-
face. One might also argue that measures of online cheating
are gaining ecological validity with the increasing tendency for
people to spend their time online.
The basis of our manipulation in a false analysis of Facebook
Likes creates a potential pitfall for the credibility of the
manipulation. Participants might not believe that we have
analyzed their Likes and that their Likes reveal they have
below/above-average levels of moral alarm. Also, the participants
might suspect whether the cheating task is a genuine means
of determining the amount of money available in the prize
draw rather than a means of determining cheating. These
potential artifacts will be monitored by asking participants about
any suspicions and the believability of the manipulation at
the end.
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